Market Trading Terminal · RC10
Key risk: Unexpected inflation resurgence
Calibrated 100% · raw 140% — adjusted by the learning loop
AI updated 6/29/2026, 12:30:26 PM
Microstructure, quotes, and decision memory
Live market activity from the aggregated feed. Two-sided quotes appear when an order book is available for this market.
Who contributed to this decision
| Provider | Score | Accuracy | On this market |
|---|---|---|---|
| fincept | 1 | — | Active |
| polymarket | — | — | Active |
| oryn_db | — | — | Active |
| mistral | — | — | Active |
| news | 1 | — | Global only |
| social | 1 | — | Global only |
| economic_calendar | 1 | — | Global only |
| trends | 1 | — | Global only |
| google_trends | 1 | — | Global only |
ORYN polls Claude, GPT, Gemini and more — consensus appears as models respond.
Crowd Consensus
14%
ORYN Consensus
15%
Signal Score
+1.4
Opportunity
1.2
Related markets and connected predictions
Simulated execution for this market
Quality score
50/100
Fill rate
100%
Executions
112
Avg slippage
5414 bps
Open positions
0
Latency
520ms
Platform-wide model improvement
Events
1,542,180
Trades learned
112
Strategies
4
Providers scored
8
Counterfactual strategy simulations
No replay comparisons for this market yet. Replay runs as markets resolve and accumulate snapshots. Replay lab →
LOW
EV 140.0¢
Entry: 11-17
—
Resolution
77d
Decision snapshots
0
Price history
7 points
This market will resolve according to the change in basis points in the target for the Selic rate resulting from the September 2026 meeting of the Bank of Brazil’s Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM), relative to the level it was prior to this meeting. The resolution source will be official information from the Bank of Brazil, including the statement or release from its September 2026 Monetary Policy Committee meeting, scheduled for September 14-15, 2026, as listed on the official Bank of Brazil calendar (https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/about/bcb-calendar?categoria=Monetary%20Policy%20Committee%20(Copom)). This market may resolve as soon as the statement or release of the Bank of Brazil's September 2026 Monetary Policy Committee meeting with relevant data is issued. If the specified rate is defined by an upper and lower bound, the relevant change will be the change to the upper bound. If the specified rate is changed to a level not expressed in the displayed options, the change will be rounded according to the following guidelines. Increases or decreases of less than 25 bps will be rounded to 25 bps (e.g. an increase or decrease of 10 bps would be considered to be an increase or decrease of 25 bps). Increases or decreases of greater than 25 bps will be rounded to the nearest 25 bps and will be rounded away from 0 in cases of equidistance (e.g., an increase or decrease of 37.5 bps would be considered to be an increase or decrease of 50 bps). Displayed options of “Increase” or “Decrease” will include policy rate increases or decreases of any size. If the specified meeting is postponed to a date and time before the start of the next scheduled meeting, this market will resolve based on the outcome of that postponed meeting. If the specified meeting is cancelled, or postponed such that no decision is announced by the start of the next scheduled meeting, this market will resolve to the “No Change” bracket. Emergency changes to the specified rate not resulting from the specified meeting will not be considered.
Crowd-implied vs ORYN AI fair value over time, with decision markers
The market assigns a low probability (18.10%) to the Bank of Brazil decreasing the Selic rate by 50+ basis points at the September 2026 meeting. Historical tightening cycles and current macroeconomic conditions suggest limited room for aggressive easing.
A 50+ bps cut could occur if inflation falls faster than expected, growth weakens significantly, or global financial conditions ease, prompting COPOM to accelerate monetary easing. Fiscal reforms or external shocks (e.g., commodity price collapse) might also force the hand of policymakers.
The Selic rate is unlikely to be cut by 50+ bps due to persistent inflation pressures, sticky services inflation, or concerns over fiscal dominance. COPOM may prioritize credibility and gradualism, opting for smaller or no cuts despite growth concerns.
Regime: — · Confidence: 0%
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